Contests with ambiguity by Kelsey, D & Melkonyan, T
Contests with Ambiguity
By David Kelseya and Tigran Melkonyanb
a Department of Economics, University of Exeter, Streatham Court, Rennes Drive, Exeter,
EX4 4PU; e-mail: d.kelsey@exeter.ac.uk
b Behavioural Science Group, C3.115, Warwick Business School, University of Warwick,
Scarman Road, Coventry, CV4 7AL; e-mail: Tigran.Melkonyan@wbs.ac.uk
Abstract
The paper examines contests where players perceive ambiguity about their opponentsstrate-
gies and determine how perceptions of ambiguity and attitudes to ambiguity a¤ect equilib-
rium choice. Behaviour in our contest is a¤ected by pessimistic and optimistic traits. Which
of these traits dominates determines the relationship between the equilibrium under ambigu-
ity and behaviour where contenders have expected utility preferences. Our model can explain
experimental results such as overbidding and overspreading relative to Nash predictions.
JEL classications: C72, D7, D81
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Events, dear boy, events.
Response to the question what does a prime minister most fear? Attributed to
Harold Macmillan.
1 Introduction
The quote above illustrates how political life can be a¤ected by unusual shocks. Many
uncertainties in the political arena arise from the strategic behaviour of political actors. A
notable example of such interactions are electoral competitions which are often modelled as
contests (Tullock, 1980). This paper studies how contests are a¤ected by the possibility of
unusual events, which we model by assuming that participantsbeliefs about the behaviour
of others are ambiguous. Ambiguity refers to uncertainties for which it is impossible or
di¢ cult to assign precise probabilities.
Many important economic interactions can be represented as contests where participants
expend resources to obtain a single or multiple prizes and both winners and losers forfeit the
resources expended during the competition. The relevant resources in the case of a political
election are the campaign expenditures. Success is more likely the greater the amount
that a candidate spends. However, it is a decreasing function of campaign expenditures
by his/her opponents. Theoretical and empirical advances in the literature have led to a
better understanding of the strategic forces and trade-o¤s in these and other contest-like
environments and to recommendations for improving upon economic, political, and social
outcomes. However, there is a stark dissonance between a number of standard theoretical
results and the evidence which jeopardises the practical import of the theory.
We propose that these phenomena may be a response to ambiguity. Specically we argue
that participants in a contest may perceive ambiguity about their opponentsactions and
study how perceptions of ambiguity and attitudes to ambiguity a¤ect equilibrium behaviour.
In his pioneering study, Ellsberg (1961) argued that individuals will exhibit behaviour that
reveals preferences which di¤erentiate between risk (known probabilities) and ambiguity
(unknown probabilities). The prevalence of Ellsberg-type behaviour in experimental and
naturally occurring settings has stimulated e¤orts to develop and axiomatise alternative
models of decision-making.1
Our primary motivation is that it may be intrinsically di¢ cult for contest participants
1For reviews of the literature on ambiguity, see Etner et al. (2012) and Trautmann et al. (2015).
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to attach unique probabilities to the behaviour of other contenders. In other words, partic-
ipants in many real-world contests may perceive ambiguity about their opponentschoices.
Thus, we argue that the new explanation is plausible and, hence, modeling of these types
of contests should reect sensitivity of participants to ambiguity. Moreover, understanding
how ambiguity a¤ects behaviour sheds new light on actual expenditure and winning patterns
in contest-like environments.
Ambiguity is likely when the resolution of uncertainty depends on:
 rare events for which little or no historical data is available;
 the behaviour of other people, which is intrinsically di¢ cult to predict;
 new or advanced technology.
Some or all of these factors are present in many of the situations in which contest theory is
applied as the following examples illustrate. For all of these and other real-world situations,
no two contests are exactly alike and consequently any information about past behaviour is
a very imperfect predictor of actions in future contests. Thus, one might expect ambiguity
to persist over time.
1.1. Research and Development All of these factors can be present in patent races.
Research and development, almost by denition, involves discovering something which was
previously unknown. Thus historical data is at most of limited help. The outcome will often
depend on complex and/or advanced technology and nally it relies on human beings having
good ideas.
1.2. Political Campaigns Politics is frequently upset by unusual developments as the
opening quotation illustrates. The outcome of electoral competitions depends on the behav-
iour of other people and upsets are not infrequent. These may be both from external events,
the behaviour of opponents, or even actions taken by allies.2 Historical data may be of little
use if new parties or issues have emerged since the last election.3
2In the case of the 2016 US presidential election, there was substantial ambiguity in the beginning and
midst of the campaign about the positions and actions that Donald Trump would be taking.
3For instance, international terrorism was not a prominent issue in elections in western countries before
2001.
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Consider a competition where multiple candidates expend resources to win a political
o¢ ce. A candidate will condition her/his actions to win the election on expectations of what
her/his opponents might do. The standard approach to analyzing this strategic environment
hinges upon the assumption that each contenders strategy is conditioned on predictions
of the opponents choices represented by a unique probability distribution and that the
equilibrium beliefs are correct. That is, contestants are assumed to behave according to the
prescriptions of Nash equilibrium. In reality, a contender may entertain multiple scenarios
about the strategies that will be employed by her political opponents. For example, under
one scenario a contestants opponents pursue a relatively negative campaign with a relatively
large likelihood while under a di¤erent scenario the likelihood of a negative campaign by the
opponents is relatively small. In other words, a contender may be unable to assign a unique
probability to each course of action by her/his opponents.4
1.3. War and Conict Military conict is also highly ambiguous. Wars can often be
viewed as unique events, since they have numerous idiosyncratic features. The outcome de-
pends on human behaviour. A collapse in morale can result in a large army being defeated by
a weaker opponent. New technology is frequently an important factor in war. Commanders
often have imperfect information about the progress of a battle. O¤ensive actions are much
more likely to succeed if they contain a large element of surprise. This creates considerable
ambiguity for the other side.
1.4. Litigation Consider a litigation process where the opposing sides spend resources to
a¤ect the outcome in their favour. Does a party to a litigation process have a clearidea,
in probabilistic sense, about the strategy that will be followed by the opponent? For many
cases that are not settled prior to going to court and are not commonplace, a considerable
amount of ambiguity may be present about strategies that will be followed by the opposing
side and this is likely to a¤ect the litigating sidesactual behaviour.5
4In addition to predicting the opponents behaviour, candidates also need to take into account the
behavior of potential voters. This may also involve considerable degree of ambiguity from the perspective of
contenders and pundits alike. Although we dont explicitly model this type of ambiguity, the techniques in
the present paper can be rather easily extended to address this scenario.
5The probability of a favourable verdict may also be ambiguous because the litigating parties are likely
to have little information about the disposition of the judicial body rendering the verdict.
4
We develop a model where contenders perceive ambiguity about strategies that are used
by their opponents. We prove existence of equilibrium, following which we study the compar-
ative statics of ambiguity and ambiguity-attitude. Comparative statics results are important
since they enable us to nd out what di¤erence ambiguity makes. On a technical level, our
paper contributes to the literature on monotone comparative statics since we extend the pre-
vious literature to games that have neither strategic substitutes nor strategic complements
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). The paper also investigates how equilibrium under ambiguity
is related to behaviour where contenders have expected utility preferences.
1.5. Organization of the paper The following section reviews the experimental evidence
on contests. Our model is introduced in section 3. In Section 5 we specialise to the case
of two types of players, which enables us to perform detailed comparative statics. Finally
Section 6 concludes. The appendix contains proofs of those results not proved in the text.
2 Experimental Evidence
Recent experimental research on contests reveals that average expenditure to win the prize
is signicantly higher than the Nash prediction (commonly referred to as overbidding) and
the variance of expenditure across experimental subjects is considerable (over-spreading).6
In some experiments, the extent of overbidding is so prominent that the average earnings
are negative.7 A number of possible rationalizations have been put forth. Explanations of
overbidding include hypotheses that experimental subjects
 derive a non-monetary utility from winning, on top of monetary incentives to win a
prize (Sheremeta, 2010, Chen et al., 2011),
 exhibit behaviour sensitive to the experimental design (Chowdhury et al., 2017),
 have spiteful preferences and inequality aversion (Herrmann and Orzen, 2008; Bartling
et al., 2009),
 have a predisposition to make mistakes (Potters et al., 1998, Lim et al., 2014),
6See Dechenaux et al. (2015) for an extensive survey of the experimental research on contests.
7There are, however, a couple of exceptions to overbidding (Shupp et al., 2013, Godoy et al., 2015). We
relate some of these experimental results to our theoretical predictions after introducing the latter.
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 rely on non-linear probability weighting to make their bids (Baharad and Nitzan, 2008,
Du¤y and Matros, 2012), and
 exhibit loss aversion (Kong, 2008).
Di¤erences in these behavioural traits can also explain, at least in theory, a part of
the large variation in expenditure of experimental subjects. The overspreading has also been
linked to variation in risk aversion and demographic characteristics of experimental subjects.
We believe that ambiguity may be relevant for explaining experimental research on con-
tests. Consider a typical experiment testing predictions for a game where experimental
subjects acquire lottery tickets and a participants probability of winning is equal to the
ratio of the number of tickets (s)he has purchased to the total number of tickets sold. A
subject in this type of experiment is likely to be uncertain about the number of lottery tickets
that will be purchased by the other participants. (S)he may entertain a range of possibilities
for the number of tickets that are bought by her opponents. Furthermore, it is not at all
clear that (s)he will assign a unique probability to each of these possibilities. (S)he may very
well contemplate a set of likelihoods for some of the prospects. In other words, the subjects
beliefs may be ambiguous. The subjects may not only perceive ambiguity about the oppo-
nentspossible play but may also exhibit sensitivity to this ambiguity. An optimistic player
(or, equivalently, an ambiguity-loving decision-maker) will expect her opponents to buy a
relatively small number of tickets. In contrast, a pessimist (or an ambiguity-averse decision-
maker) will expect her opponents to buy a relatively large number of tickets. As a result,
an increase in the magnitude of ambiguity may have very di¤erent e¤ects on pessimistic and
optimistic contenders. The model in the present paper can explain overbidding and over-
spreading, relative to the Nash prediction, which are commonly observed in experimental
studies of contests.
3 The model
Consider a contest with n  2 players. To improve her chances of winning the prize each
contestant i 2 f1; 2; :::; ng chooses action xi 2 Xi = [xi; xi] ; where xi  0 and 1 > xi > 0:
On occasion, we will refer to these actions as e¤ort or expenditure invested in the contest.
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The bounds on e¤ort levels may reect institutional constraints. For example, in many
presidential elections candidates receive public funds to compete. These serve as a lower
bound on the amount that the candidates will spend on their election campaigns. The bounds
may also be subjective where they represent the opponentsbeliefs about a players potential
choices, rather than physical restrictions on the permissible values of contest expenditures.8
For many competitive environments, it is sensible to expect that players will not anticipate
that all of their opponents will choose zero e¤ort; xi > 0 for some or even all i. Thus, even
though zero bids are allowed players may believe that their opponents will choose strictly
positive expenditure levels.
It is equally reasonable to expect that contenders may believe that their opponentsex-
penditures will not exceed a certain nite upper bound. The assumption that the expenditure
to win the contest may be constrained from above also accounts for possibilities of budget-
constrained participants and for possible exogenous restrictions on the level of expenditures
in the contest (e.g., an upper threshold on expenditures set by a contest designer).9 For
practical reasons, in what follows we mainly focus on the interpretation of (x1; :::; xn) and
(x1; :::; xn) as beliefs about possible bounds on the opponentspotential choices.
The cost of action xi is given by xi and incurred irrespective of the contests outcome.
The probability that contestant i receives the prize, the contest success function (CSF), is
given by
pi (xi; x i) =
8><>:
hi(xi)Pn
j=1 hj(xj)
if 9j 2 f1; :::; ng such that xj > 0
1
n
if xj = 0 for all j 2 f1; :::; ng
; (1)
where x i  (x1; :::; xi 1; xi+1; :::; xn) denotes the vector of action choices by all players except
for contestant i: The set of strategy combinations of player is opponents is denoted by X i
and the set of strategy combinations of all players is denoted by X. We also let x denote the
vector of action choices by all participants in the contest; x  (x1; x2; :::; xn) : The function
hi () (i = 1; :::; n) is assumed to be increasing in its argument. Under this assumption, pi is
increasing in own action and decreasing in the actions of the opponents. It is also assumed
8For an early treatment of contests where expenditure must exceed some minimum level, see Schoonbeek
and Kooreman (1997).
9Since resources are scarce, all of the participants in a contest will be budget constrained. However, for
some or all contenders the budget constraint may be non-binding.
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that hi () is concave and twice-continuously di¤erentiable and hi (0) = 0 for all i = 1; :::; n.
The assumption of concavity of hi () implies that pi (xi; x i) is concave for all xi > 0 and
all x i:10
Contestant is utility function is given by
Ui
 
xi;
X
j 6=i
hj (xj)
!
= pi (xi; x i)Vi   xi; (2)
where Vi denotes the value of the prize to contestant i: The assumption that the contenders
are risk neutral is made primarily with the purpose of focusing on the e¤ect of ambiguity
aversion. Our results carry over to a more general setting with risk averse preferences under
appropriate qualifying conditions.
The contest considered in the paper falls into a general category of aggregative games
(Cornes and Hartley, 2011; Acemoglu and Jensen, 2013). The strategic interaction considered
in the paper is a game with negative aggregate externalities (Eichberger et al., 2009), since
the CSF in (1) is decreasing in the aggregate
hP
j 6=i hj (xj)
i
of the opponentsactions. The
cross-partial derivative of contender is utility function with respect to own and opponent
ks actions is equal to
@2Ui

xi;
P
j 6=i hj (xj)

@xi@xk
=
@2pi (xi; x i)
@xi@xk
Vi;
where
@2pi (xi; x i)
@xi@xk
=  h0i (xi)h0k (xk)
hP
j 6=i hj (xj)
i
  hi (xi)hPn
j=1 hj (xj)
i3 :
It follows from this expression that the marginal benet of own action @pi(xi;x i)
@xi
is de-
creasing in opponent ks action when player is opponents choose relatively large actionsP
j 6=i hj (xj) > hi (xi)

: However, it is increasing when the opponents choose relatively
small actions
P
j 6=i hj (xj) < hi (xi)

. In other words, when the aggregate of a players op-
10We maintain the assumption of a general function hi () in this section. To streamline the presentation
of our ndings, Section 4 adopts the functional form hi (xi) = x

i while Section 5 assumes simple lotteries
with hi (xi) = xi. To see that these assumptions are without loss of generality, note that by applying the
transformation h 1i () to the choice variables, player is objective function is transformed into an objective
of a contender playing a simple lottery and having a non-linear cost function h 1i () :
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ponentse¤orts is su¢ ciently large, an increase in any opponents e¤ort will crowd out the
players e¤ort (the player will partially give in). On the other hand, when the aggregate of a
players opponentse¤orts is su¢ ciently small, the player will respond to an increase in any
opponents e¤ort by increasing her e¤ort (the player will keep up). Thus, this game does
not globally exhibit either strategic complementarity or strategic substitutability (Bulow et
al., 1985). Note also that when all players have the same function hj and choose the same
action, the strategies of the players are (local) strategic substitutes.
Suppose that the contenders perceive ambiguity about their opponentschoice of action.
This ambiguity is represented by a capacity which reects the weights a player places on
di¤erent strategies of the opponents. A capacity is similar to a subjective probability with
the exception that it may be non-additive. We restrict our attention to the case where the
ambiguity for contestant i is represented by a neo-additive capacity11 vi dened on the set
of the opponentsstrategies X i :
vi (?) = 0; vi (X i) = 1; and vi (A) = i (1  i)+(1  i)i (A) for all ? & A & X i; (3)
where i; i 2 [0; 1] and i is a standard probability distribution on X i: Contestant i has
some doubts that the probability distribution i () is the true probability distribution over
the opponentsstrategies and this ambiguity is reected by the parameter i: Parameter i
characterises contestant is ambiguity attitude. The support of a neo-additive capacity vi
is dened by supp(vi) = supp(i). We focus on neo-additive capacities because they o¤er
a clear-cut separation of ambiguity perception from ambiguity attitude and allow for both
ambiguity-averse and ambiguity-loving decision-makers. Moreover, contests have focal best
and worst outcomes, i.e. winning and losing, which makes neo-additive capacities particularly
suitable for analysis.
It is assumed that all participants in the contest have Choquet expected utility (CEU)
11A capacity v on a set S is a set function v : S ! [0; 1] such that v (?) = 0; v (S) = 1; and v (A)  v (B)
for any A;B  S and B  A:
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preferences (Schmeidler, 1989) with a neo-additive capacity (Chateauneuf et al., 2007):
Wi (xi; i; i; i) = i (1  i)Mi (xi)+iimi (xi)+(1  i)
Z
Ui
 
xi;
X
j 6=i
hj (xj)
!
di (x i) ;
(4)
where
Mi (xi)  max
x i2X i
Ui
 
xi;
X
j 6=i
hj (xj)
!
=
hi (xi)
hi (xi) + Y  i
Vi   xi;
mi (xi)  min
x i2X i
Ui
 
xi;
X
j 6=i
hj (xj)
!
=
hi (xi)
hi (xi) + Y i
Vi   xi;
Y  i 
P
j 6=i
hj
 
xj

and Y i 
P
j 6=i
hj (xj) :
The functionMi (xi) represents the best possible scenario of player is opponentschoices for
player i while mi (xi) corresponds to the worst possible scenario.
A neo-additive capacity has the following intuitive interpretation and behavioural impli-
cations. A decision-maker with CEU preferences and a neo-additive capacity has subjective
beliefs characterised by the additive probability distribution i () but lacks condence in this
belief. When i = 0; the decision-maker is certain in her probabilistic assessment i () and,
as a result, has expected utility preferences. In contrast, when i > 0; (s)he will take into
account the e¤ect of her actions on the best and worst outcomes. The larger the parameter
i; the greater the weight that the decision-maker will place on these two extreme outcomes
and the larger the deviation from the expected utility preferences. Thus, it is natural to
interpret i as measuring ambiguity, and we shall refer to it as the degree of ambiguity. The
decision-makers reaction to uncertainty about beliefs has optimistic and pessimistic traits.
The optimistic trait is reected by the weight on the best outcome Mi (xi), measured by
i (1  i) ; while the pessimistic trait is given by the weight on the worst outcome mi (xi) ;
measured by ii. Relatively high (low) values of i correspond to pessimistic (optimistic)
attitudes to ambiguity. Thus, parameter i is referred to as the degree of pessimism (or
degree of ambiguity aversion).
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Substituting from (2) into (4), we obtain:
Wi (xi; i; i; i)
=

i

(1  i)hi (xi)
hi (xi) + Y  i
+
ihi (xi)
hi (xi) + Y i

+ (1  i)
Z 
hi (xi)
hi (xi) + Y i

di (x i)

Vi   xi;
where Y i 
P
j 6=i hj (xj) :We assume that, given the structure of the game, the i ()s are
determined endogenously while the degrees of optimism, i, and ambiguity, i, are treated
as exogenous parameters. A decision-makers attitude towards ambiguity i is a personal
trait akin to tastes in a standard consumer problem. Thus, it is reasonable to suppose that
it is independent of the decision problem and exogenous inuences.
Dene the best-response correspondence of player i; given that her/his beliefs are repre-
sented by a neo-additive capacity vi; by Ri(vi) = Ri (i; i; i)  argmax
xi2Xi
Wi (xi; i; i; i).
We adopt the following denition from Eichberger and Kelsey (2014), which is an extension
of an earlier work in Dow and Werlang (1994):12
Denition 1 (equilibrium under ambiguity) A vector of neo-additive capacities (v^1; v^2; :::; v^n)
is an Equilibrium Under Ambiguity (EUA) if for all i = 1; ::; n, ? 6= supp (v^i)  
j 6=i
Rj(v^j).
If x^ i 2 supp (v^i) for all i = 1; 2; ::; n; then (x^1; x^2; :::; x^n) is called an equilibrium strategy
prole. If supp (v^i) contains a single vector x^ i for each player i = 1; 2; :::; n; we will say
that x^ is a singleton equilibrium.
Thus, an equilibrium is characterised by a capacity for each player. The support of this
capacity consists of strategies that are best responses for the opponents. In the Appendix
we prove that this strategic interaction has a singleton EUA:
Proposition 2 The contest has a singleton EUA (v1; :::; v

n) where v

i = i (1  i)+(1  i) i ;
12For alternative approaches to analyzing strategic behavior under ambiguity, see, e.g. example, Lo
(1996), Marinacci (2000), Eichberger and Kelsey (2000), Bade (2011), and Hanany et al. (2016).
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i
 
x i

= 1 for i = 1; :::; n; x =

1
P
j 6=1 hj
 
xj

; :::; n
P
j 6=n hj
 
xj

;
i
 X
j 6=i
hj (xj)
!
=
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
xi; if
@Zi(xi;
P
j 6=i hj(xj))
@xi
 0
xi; if
@Zi(xi;
P
j 6=i hj(xj))
@xi
> 0
unique positive solution of
@Zi(xi;
P
j 6=i hj(xj);i;i)
@xi
= 0;
otherwise
(5)
and
Zi(xi;
X
j 6=i
hj (xj) ; i; i) =

i
 
(1  i) pi
 
xi; x i

+ ipi (xi; x i)

+ (1  i) pi (xi; x i)

Vi xi:
(6)
Proof. See Appendix.
This singleton equilibrium is the ambiguous equivalent of a pure strategy Nash equilib-
rium. There may also be non-singleton equilibria, in which there are two or more strategies
in the support of the playersbeliefs. These are the ambiguous analogues of mixed strategy
Nash equilibria. We focus on the singleton equilibrium since, even in the absence of ambi-
guity, the interpretation of mixed equilibrium is problematic.13 Given that (the analogies
of) pure strategy equilibria always exist in our model, it is desirable to avoid these issues by
conning attention to such equilibria.
We demonstrate in the proof of the above proposition that the payo¤ function can be
written as (6) so that the contest under ambiguity is equivalent to a contest where player is
probability of winning the prize is equal to14
i
 
(1  i) pi
 
xi; x i

+ ipi (xi; x i)

+ (1  i) pi (xi; x i)
13Since players are indi¤erent between all of the strategies to which they assign a positive probability
they have no incentive to play the strategy which sustains the mixed equilibrium (Osborne and Rubinstein,
1994).
14The transformation of the probability of winning a contest in our paper is di¤erent from misperceptions
about the probability of winning a contest that may be associated with the experimental design (Chowdhury
et al., 2017). The two correspond to very di¤erent behavioral traits. A comparison is made di¢ cult by the
fact that the probability misperception story does not yet possess a theoretical underpinning of how exactly
these misperceptions are formed and how they interact with other components of the model. Even if one were
to formally model the misperception story, we believe that this theory would not yield predictions similar to
our model. For example, we show below that overbidding can be a non-monotonic function of the number
of players. In contrast, it seems that probability mispercetpions are likely to be monotonic in the number of
contenders, yielding a monotonic relationship between overbidding and the number of contestants.
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and the value of the prize is equal to Vi: The latter expression reveals that the incen-
tives to invest in the contest come through three di¤erent channels; the optimistic scenario
i (1  i) pi
 
xi; x i

; the pessimistic scenario iipi (xi; x i) ; and the standardscenario
(1  i) pi (xi; x i) :
4 Symmetric case
We begin with an analysis of a symmetric contest where all of the players have the same
value of the prize, the same contest success function, the same lower and upper bounds on
contest expenditures, and the same degrees of pessimism:15
V1 =    = Vn  V; h1 () =    = hn () = h () ;
x1 =    = xn  x; x1 =    = xn  x;
1 =    = n  ; 1 =    = n  :
Suppose also that h (x) = x, where   1 (Tullock, 1967, 1980): There are a number of
reasons we examine symmetric contests. First, they are more tractable. Second, they are
more illustrative of how the degrees of ambiguity and ambiguity aversion a¤ect behaviour
in contests. Third, many experimental studies entail various symmetry assumptions and we
are interested in juxtaposing our ndings to the received experimental evidence.16
In a symmetric equilibrium, x1 = ::: = x

n  x: From (5), we obtain an implicit expression
15For space considerations, we mainly only focus on the comparative statics for the parameters that
distinguish our framework from the received literature, namely, those that are associated with ambiguity
about opponentsbehavior.
16The assumption that all players have the same perception of ambiguity and attitude to ambiguity is a
simplifying assumption which is relaxed in later sections of the paper.
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for the unique interior symmetric equilibrium (when it exists)17:
z (x; ; )   (n  1) (x) 1
2664
0BB@ (1  )
x
((x)+(n 1)x)2
+ x

((x)+(n 1)x)2
1CCA+ (1  ) 1n2 (x)
3775V 1 = 0:
(7)
4.1 Equilibrium e¤ort and the comparative statics of ambiguity
In this section we nd and compare the Nash equilibrium and the EUA. We then proceed to
study the comparative statics of ambiguity and e¤ort. The e¤ect of the degree of ambiguity
on the equilibrium e¤ort is characterised in the following:
Lemma 3 The equilibrium e¤ort x under ambiguity is a decreasing function of the degree
of ambiguity  if and only if the Nash equilibrium e¤ort xN  (n 1)
n2
V exceeds the equilibrium
e¤ort x under ambiguity:
xN  x: (8)
Proof. See Appendix.
In the Appendix we also demonstrate that condition (8) holds if and only if
(1  )x
( (n  1)V ) + n2 (n  1)x
2 + x
( (n  1)V ) + n2 (n  1) x
2  1
n2+2 ( (n  1)V ) ;
(9)
which reveals how the model parameters a¤ect the relationship between the degree of am-
biguity  and the equilibrium e¤ort x. It also demonstrates that the equilibrium e¤ort
under ambiguity is a monotonic function of the degree of ambiguity. Under both inequality
(8) and its reverse, an increase in ambiguity widens the gap between the equilibrium e¤ort
under ambiguity and the Nash prediction. If the ambiguity attitude of the contenders (and
other parameters of the model) is such that the equilibrium e¤ort under ambiguity exceeds
the Nash prediction xN ; then an increase in the degree of ambiguity will widen this gap by
17Existence and uniqueness of an interior symmetric equilibrium is guaranteed by imposing restrictions
on the lower and upper bounds for x and other parameters of the model: The comparative statics analysis
is straightforward when either all of the players choose the lower bound on expenditure or all of the players
choose the upper bound. For this reason, we focus on the interior solutions.
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increasing the equilibrium e¤ort under ambiguity. The dark-shaded curve in Figure 1 depicts
this scenario for a parameterization of our model where the contenders are ambiguity seeking
( = 0:3). The Nash equilibrium for this example is equal to 1.6 and the equilibrium e¤ort
under ambiguity continuously increases starting from this level as the degree of ambiguity
changes from no ambiguity ( = 0) to the highest possible level of ambiguity ( = 1).
When xN  x, an increase in ambiguity widens the gap by decreasing the equilibrium
e¤ort under ambiguity. The light-shaded curve in Figure 1 depicts this possibility for the case
of ambiguity averse contenders ( = 0:9). Note also that the contenders may be ambiguity
loving but under-invest compared to the Nash equilibrium. It is easy to construct examples
where the participants are ambiguity seeking but where x is decreasing in :More generally,
it follows from (8) that if
x
( (n  1)V ) + n2 (n  1)x
2 > x
( (n  1)V ) + n2 (n  1) x
2 (10)
then there is a threshold level of the degree of ambiguity aversion such that x is increasing
in  if and only if the participants have a degree of ambiguity aversion that is smaller than
that threshold level. Conversely, if the reverse of inequality (10) holds then x is increasing
in  if and only if the participants have a degree of ambiguity aversion that is higher than
some threshold level of ambiguity aversion.
It also follows from condition (9) that the equilibrium e¤ort x either increases in the
degree of ambiguity for all  or decreases in the degree of ambiguity for all : Equivalently,
whether the contenders under-invest or overinvest relative to the Nash equilibrium is inde-
pendent of the degree of ambiguity  2 (0; 1) :
Finally, consider the case where  = 1. This is a simple lottery frequently explored in ex-
perimental studies: The parameter x may represent the subjectsendowment of experimental
currency. Suppose also that the participants in the lottery believe that their opponents will
buy at least x > 0 lottery tickets. Under this scenario, a contenders equilibrium e¤ort under
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ambiguity will exceed the Nash equilibrium if and only if
(1  ) x
(V + n2x)2
+ 
x
(V + n2x)2
  (n  1)
n4V
> 0: (11)
It follows from this expression that if the upper threshold x is relatively large compared
to the lower threshold x, then the equilibrium e¤ort under ambiguity will exceed the Nash
equilibrium if and only if the contenders are su¢ ciently optimistic. For example, when
V = 10; x = 0:5; x = 20; n = 5; the inequality holds if and only if the degree of pessimism
is less than 0:38. Formally, we use (11) to demonstrate the following18:
Proposition 4 Consider a symmetric contest with  = 1; x = V; and x = V: Then
(i) There exist ;  2 (0; 1) such that for all  2 [0; ) and all  2 (; 1] there exist n; n 2 N
such that if the playerspessimism is equal to  and the number of players is between n and
n, then the equilibrium e¤ort x under ambiguity will exceed the Nash equilibrium e¤ort xN :
(ii) There exists a threshold value n^ 2 N of the number of players such that xN > x for any
contest with more than n^ players.
(iii) There exists a threshold value ^ 2 [0; 1) of the degree of pessimism such that xN > x
for any contest where the playersdegree of pessimism exceeds ^:
Proof. See Appendix.
These ndings are very intuitive. Relatively optimistic players expect their opponents to
choose relatively low investments. When the number of opponents belongs to an intermediate
range between N and N , this results in higher incentives to invest. Consequently, the
equilibrium e¤ort under ambiguity is higher than the Nash equilibrium. This nding suggests
that overinvestment observed in experimental settings may be due to subjectsoptimistic
attitudes. Combined with the recent experimental evidence (see, e.g., Halevy, 2007, and
Ivanov, 2011) that a substantial share of experimental subjects exhibit optimism, this nding
provides an explanation for overbidding observed in the lab.
The relationship between the number of contenders and overinvestment is also sensible.
The potential for overinvestment comes from the optimistic channel and this channel is most
18This proposition extends to general symmetric contests. To economize on space, we have chosen to
state it for simple lotteries only.
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inuential when the number of players is neither too small nor too large. Proposition 4
illustrates that both the mechanism through which the number of opponents a¤ects equilib-
rium investments and the resultant comparative statics results for contests with non-linear
probability weighting and our model are di¤erent. Baharad and Nitzan (p. 2055, 2008) nd
that for contests with relatively large numbers of contestants, ...the individuals tend to be
optimistic, that is, the conceived winning probability is higher than the objective probabil-
ity and this induces them to increase their e¤ort su¢ ciently such that the contested rent
is over-dissipated.The optimistictrait in our model has a di¤erent interaction with the
number of contestants.
As a numerical illustration of Proposition 4, consider the parameterization V = x = 100
and  = 0:05: The EUA exceeds the Nash equilibrium under the following scenarios, for
example; (a) when  = 0:1; x > xN if and only if n is between 4 and 16; (b) when  = 0:2;
x > xN if and only if n is between 4 and 14; (c) when  = 0:3; x > xN if and only if n is
between 4 and 12; and (d) when  = 0:4; x > xN if and only if n is between 5 and 9: Thus,
as postulated by Proposition 4, the EUA exceeds the Nash equilibrium for intermediate
values of the number of contenders. Furthermore, this range of intermediate values expands
as the players become more optimistic. Note also that the range of values of the degree of
pessimism  and the number of players n for which overbidding occurs will expand when the
playersbeliefs about the lower threshold of their opponentsexpenditure increases (large ).
4.2 Degree of pessimism and equilibrium e¤ort
We now turn to the relationship between the equilibrium e¤ort and the contenderspes-
simism. A change in the degree of pessimism shifts the weight between the pessimistic and
optimistic channels, leaving the standard channel intact. The overall e¤ect depends on which
of these channels provides stronger incentives to invest in the contest. Formally, we have:
Proposition 5 The equilibrium e¤ort x under ambiguity will increase in the degree of
pessimism  if and only if
x > (n  1) 1 pxx; (12)
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which holds if and only if

(
p
xx)
1 

x

2 + x

2
2 + (1  ) (n  1)n2 (pxx) > (n  1)
1

V
: (13)
Proof. See Appendix.
It follows immediately from (13) that:
Corollary 6 The equilibrium e¤ort x under ambiguity will decrease in the degree of pes-
simism  if at least one of the following conditions is satised:
(i) the value of the prize V is su¢ ciently small,
(ii) the number of contestants n is su¢ ciently large,
(iii) the lower bound x on e¤ort is su¢ ciently large, and
(iv) the upper bound x on e¤ort is su¢ ciently large.
To gain intuition into the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the equilibrium e¤ort to
be decreasing in the degree of pessimism, recall the three channels through which changes in
the parameters a¤ect the incentives to invest in the contest; the optimistic, pessimistic, and
standard channels. Consider a decrease in the value of the prize V: The incentives to invest
for all three channels will decrease. Moreover, the disincentives to invest associated with
the pessimistic channel will be more prominent for a lower value of the prize. Hence, the
equilibrium e¤ort will be lower for contests with relatively pessimistic contenders and low
value of the prize. Similar reasoning underlies part (ii) of Corollary 6. Consider now part (iv)
of the Corollary (part (iii) has a similar intuition). A relatively pessimistic contender places
most of the weight on the scenario where her opponents choose a relatively large expenditure,
namely the upper bound x: Part (iv) of the Corollary follows because an increase in x results
in a decrease in the marginal benet of own action and because this e¤ect is stronger when
the contender is relatively pessimistic.
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5 The model with two types of contenders
Suppose, as in the previous section, that x1 =    = xn  x and x1 =    = xn  x: But,
in contrast to the preceding section, the contenders may di¤er in terms of their degrees of
ambiguity ; their degrees of ambiguity aversion ; and their values of the prize: There are
two types of contenders; type-A contenders, who have a common degree of ambiguity A and
common degree of ambiguity aversion A; and type-B contenders, who have a common degree
of ambiguity B and common degree of ambiguity aversion B: The contenders f1; :::;mg
(for 1  m  n   1) are of type A while the remaining contenders are of type B. For
simplicity, we assume that h1 () =    = hn () = h (x) = x; thus, restricting the setup
in this section to simple lotteries. This assumption can be relaxed but at the expense of
substantially cluttering the exposition.
When all contenders have the same value of the prize, V1 =    = Vn  V; we will
focus on an equilibrium where all contenders of the same type choose the same action;
x1 = ::: = x

m  xA and xm+1 = ::: = xn  xB: From the rst-order conditions in (5), the
equilibrium actions (xA; x

B) for an interior equilibrium in this case are implicitly given by
the following system of equations19:
(n  1) A

(1  A)x
(xA + (n  1)x)2
+
Ax
(xA + (n  1) x)2

+ (1  A) (m  1)xA + (n m)xB
(mxA + (n m)xB)2
=
1
V
;
(14)
(n  1) B

(1  B)x
(xB + (n  1)x)2
+
Bx
(xB + (n  1) x)2

+ (1  B) mxA + (n m  1)xB
(mxA + (n m)xB)2
=
1
V
:
5.1 The model with two contenders
The assumption of two contenders allows for an informative graphical illustration of the
comparative statics for ambiguity attitude and degree of ambiguity. We begin with the
case where there is one player of each type, players A and B; and suppose, without loss of
generality, that winning the contest is worth at least as much to player A as to player B:
Hence, the value of the prize to the two individuals is given by VA = V and VB = V; where
19As in the previous section, an interior equilibrium materializes for certain conditions on the model
parameters: A full analysis of corner solutions is available from the authors upon request.
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0 6  6 1:
As a benchmark, we continue to use the Nash equilibrium which in this case is given by:
xNA =
V
( + 1)2
and xNB =
2V
( + 1)2
: (15)
Both xNA and x
N
B are increasing in  on the set of feasible values 0 6  6 1: They take
their maximum values at  = 1; in which case xNA = x
N
B =
V
4
: Thus, the symmetric contest
produces the highest e¤ort levels. This arises because competition is more intense in a
symmetric contest. The marginal benet of e¤ort is greater when a player is level with
his/her opponent than when (s)he is clearly ahead or clearly behind.
Assume that the set of feasible strategies may be written in the form [V; V ] ; where
0 <  < 1
4
and  > 1
4
:20 Under this assumption, the symmetric Nash equilibrium is in the
interior of the strategy sets. Comparing xNA ; x
N
B ; x

A; and x

B; we obtain:
Proposition 7 Suppose that both players perceive a positive degree of ambiguity (A; B >
0). In an EUA both players will choose an e¤ort lower than xNA , i.e. x

i 6 V(+1)2 for i = A;B:
Proof. See Appendix.
Thus, in any EUA both players provide less e¤ort than the Nash equilibrium e¤ort level
of the player with the highest value of the prize. Hence, ambiguity causes player A to choose
lower e¤ort than her Nash equilibrium level. In contrast, player B may provide more or less
e¤ort than her Nash level. It is straightforward to construct examples where the player with
the lower valuation of the prize overbids compared to Nash.
Godoy et al. (2015) conducted a series of two-player laboratory contests and demon-
strated that expenditure levels were higher in the treatment where contest expenditures are
sequential and observable than in the treatment where expenditures wee chosen simultane-
ously. This nding is consistent with the predictions of our model. It is natural to anticipate
that players will not perceive much ambiguity in contests where expenditures are sequential
and observable. In contrast, one may expect players to perceive signicant ambiguity about
20The assumption  > 0 is equivalent to the requirement xi > 0: For a motivation of the latter assumption,
see the beginning of Section 3.
20
the opponents action when the choices are made simultaneously. For the case of two players,
such increase in ambiguity will result in lower expenditure according to Proposition 7.
It follows immediately from Proposition 7 that:
Corollary 8 Suppose that both players perceive a positive degree of ambiguity (A; B > 0)
and have the same value of the prize V . Then, in an EUA both players will make strictly
less than the Nash equilibrium level of contributions xNA = x
N
B =
V
4
.
The intuition behind this nding is as follows. Recall that the incentives to invest come
through three channels. The pessimistic and optimistic channels produce incentives to invest
that are lower than the incentives for the game without ambiguity. A complete pessimist
believes that her opponent will choose a very large investment. In this case, the marginal
product of the players e¤ort is relatively low since (s)he believes that (s)he will likely lose
the contest unless (s)he invests a very large amount. The marginal product of e¤ort is also
relatively low for an optimist since there is only one opponent and optimism causes a player to
overweight low e¤ort from her opponent.21 In this case, the player believes that (s)he can win
the contest without much e¤ort. Ambiguity causes the decision-maker to overweight both
possibilities. As a result, the equilibrium expenditures under ambiguity are lower than in the
Nash equilibrium. In the following section we show that, even with symmetric valuations,
the EUA can exceed the Nash equilibrium in games with more than two contenders.
We now turn to the comparative statics. For space considerations, in the rest of the
paper we focus on the case where all players have the same value of the prize.
In a contest with two contenders, player As and Bs best response functions, A (xB)
and B (xA) ; for interior solutions are given by the unique solutions to the corresponding
equations in (14) with n = 2 and m = 1: Lemma 12 in the Appendix summarises the
monotonicity properties of the best-response functions. Figure 2 depicts these functions.
For xi > xj a marginal increase in the opponents action xj intensies the competition
leading to an increase in player is e¤ort. In contrast, for xj > xi an increase in xj reduces
the intensity of the competition leading to a decrease in player is e¤ort. Player As (player
21With multiple opponents, the optimistic channel may induce more e¤ort from a player than under Nash.
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Bs) best response curve is downward (upward) sloping above the 450 degree line and upward
(downward) sloping below it.
As a starting point in the comparison of equilibrium e¤orts we take a two-player symmet-
ric contest where both players perceive the same degree of ambiguity  and have the same
degree of pessimism : For such contests, we have:
Proposition 9 Suppose 1 
4x
+ x
(x+x)2
> 1
V
: Then, the two-player symmetric contest has a
unique equilibrium. Moreover, this equilibrium is symmetric and interior.
Proof. See Appendix.
When 1 
4x
+ x
(x+x)2
 1
V
; both players will choose the lowest possible expenditure x:
We sidestep this uninteresting case and instead focus on interior solutions in the rest of this
section. It follows immediately from Lemma 3 and Corollary 8 that for a symmetric contest
with two contenders, the unique equilibrium e¤ort is a strictly decreasing function of the
common degree of ambiguity : Proposition 5 in turn implies that for a symmetric two-
contender contest the symmetric equilibrium will be a decreasing function of the common
degree of pessimism if and only if x <
p
xx; which implies by Proposition 8 that if xx > V
2
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then the symmetric equilibrium will be a decreasing function of the degree of pessimism. The
e¤ect of an increase in the degree of pessimism is to shift the decision weight from the best
outcome to the worst. Under inequality xx > V
2
16
; the extra weight on the worst outcome
a¤ects the marginal benet more than the reduction of the weight on the best outcome.
We demonstrate in the Appendix (see Lemma 13) that the best response functions are
single-peaked with the peak located at the unique symmetric equilibrium (see Figure 2
and the following proposition). Using this property of the best response functions, we can
determine how changes in the degrees of ambiguity and attitudes to ambiguity of individual
players a¤ect behaviour starting from the symmetric environment. Let xA = xB = x denote
the equilibrium e¤ort level for a symmetric contest with A = B =  and A = B = 
and let (x0A; x
0
B) denote the equilibrium for an asymmetric contest with j =  < i = 
0 and
A = B = , where i; j 2 fA;Bg and i 6= j:22 Figure 2 depicts the e¤ect of an increase
22It is implicitly assumed that an increase in the degree of ambiguity from  to 0 is relatively small. See
the proof of the following proposition for more details.
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in player As degree of ambiguity on equilibrium behaviour starting from the symmetric
scenario. As a result of this change, player As best response curve shifts leftward while
player Bs best response curve remains unchanged. The EUA moves from point A to point
A0: Formally, we have:
Proposition 10 An increase in player is (i 2 fA;Bg) degree of ambiguity starting from
a symmetric contest will strictly decrease both playersequilibrium e¤orts; x0k < xk for k 2
fA;Bg. Moreover, the resulting reduction in player is e¤ort will strictly exceed the reduction
in player js (j 6= i) e¤ort; x0j > x0i:
Proof. See Appendix.
An increase in ambiguity perceived by player i causes her to put more weight on the
possibility that her opponent will choose very high expenditure x or very low expenditure x.
This decreases player is perceived marginal benet and, as a result, reduces her equilibrium
e¤ort. Since the competition from player i has become less intense, player j 6= i responds by
decreasing her e¤ort as well. However, to stay ahead of her opponent in terms of having a
higher probability of winning, player j reduces e¤ort by less than player i. Thus, an increase
in player is degree of ambiguity renders a strategic advantage to player j and improves the
latter players payo¤. Proposition 10 also implies that when the two contenders are involved
in a rent-seeking activity, an increase in ambiguity perceived by either player will decrease
the amount of rent dissipation. This may explain why in practice rent dissipation is not full,
contrary to Tullocks predictions.
Consider the e¤ect of changes in player is degree of ambiguity aversion and now let
(x0A; x
0
B) denote the equilibrium of an asymmetric contest with A = B =  and j =  <
i = 
0, where i; j 2 fA;Bg and i 6= j: Conducting analysis similar to that for the previous
proposition, we obtain:23
Proposition 11 An increase in player is (i 2 fA;Bg) degree of ambiguity aversion starting
from a symmetric contest will decrease both players equilibrium e¤orts; x0k < xk for k 2
23The results for the scenarios where the playersvalues of the prize, initial degrees of ambiguity, and
their initial attitudes to ambiguity are asymmetric are available from the authors upon request.
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fA;Bg. Moreover, the resulting reduction in player is e¤ort will exceed the reduction in
player js (j 6= i) e¤ort; x0j > x0i:
5.2 The model with more than two players
Consider the case with m identical ambiguity averse contenders and (n m) identical am-
biguity loving contenders. Figure 3 depicts the relationship between the number m of ambi-
guity averse contenders and the equilibrium expenditures of representative ambiguity averse
and ambiguity loving contenders for a specic parameterization of our model. In this case,
irrespective of the fraction of ambiguity averse players the equilibrium expenditure of ambi-
guity averse contenders is below the Nash equilibrium level (which is equal to 8) while the
equilibrium expenditure of ambiguity loving contenders is above it. Note also that as the
number of ambiguity averse players monotonically increases, both contender types increase
their equilibrium expenditures.
The results reported in Figure 3 and, more generally, our ndings in the previous sections
demonstrate that perceptions and attitudes to ambiguity provide an explanation for over-
spreading frequently observed in experiments. A signicant diversity of ambiguity attitudes,
which is frequently observed in the lab (see, e.g., Halevy, 2007), can lead to considerable
variations of actual investments in contests.
Contrasting these and Section 4s ndings with those in Section 5.1, the reader will have
noticed that there is a di¤erence between the results for two-player contests and multi-player
contests (by a multi-player contest we mean three or more players.). In two-player symmetric
contests ambiguity always gives rise to e¤ort levels below the Nash equilibrium. In contrast,
in multi-player contests ambiguity can give rise to overbidding.
The di¤erence can be explained intuitively as follows. Individual e¤ort levels are mainly
determined by the perceived marginal benet of e¤ort, which is in turn inuenced by the
intensity of competition. If a player is a long way ahead he has low marginal benet since he
is likely to win regardless of his/her own e¤ort. Similarly an individual who is far behind will
have a low marginal benet, since (s)he is likely to lose whatever (s)he does. The highest
marginal benet comes in a roughly equal contest which gives rise to the most intense
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competition between the players.
In a multi-player contest each individual is e¤ectively competing against the aggregate
e¤ort of all the others. Thus in a reasonably equal contest without ambiguity each individual
perceives him/herself as being behind. For instance, if there are ve similar players and each
supplies 1
5
of the total e¤ort and thus has a relatively low (around 20%) chance of winning.
Thus (s)he has a relatively low marginal benet of e¤ort. Now assume that a given player
is ambiguity loving. Then (s)he will place positive decision weight on the possibility that
his/her rivals will supply very low e¤ort. This will increase his/her marginal benet since
it reduces the gap between the given individuals e¤ort and the aggregate e¤ort of the
others. Suppose the given individual is very optimistic and takes this low level to be 1
4
of
the equilibrium e¤ort. Then (s)he will perceive him/herself to be in a roughly equal contest
with the aggregate of the other players. As a result, his/her marginal benet of e¤ort will
be relatively high.
6 Conclusion
The paper has developed and analysed contests where contenders perceive ambiguity about
strategies of their opponents. In addition to proving existence of equilibrium under am-
biguity and exploring its uniqueness properties, we have investigated how the degree of
ambiguity regarding other participantsstrategies and preferences toward ambiguity a¤ect
equilibrium behaviour. The paper also established a relationship between the equilibrium
under ambiguity and Nash equilibrium.
Our results suggest that relatively optimistic players tend to invest more than their
pessimistic counterparts. Pessimists over-weight the event that their opponents will provide
high e¤ort which mutes incentives to expend resources. In contrast, optimists over-weight the
scenario that opponents will choose low expenditures. In multi-player games the incentives
to invest can be stronger when opponents choose relatively small expenditures than under
the most pessimistic scenario. As a result, optimists invest more and have a higher chance
of winning. This e¤ect is especially pronounced for intermediate numbers of the opponents.
In the introduction, we have put forth a number of reasons why players in a contest may
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perceive ambiguity. One of the motivations stemmed from the uniqueness of many contests
which may lead to ambiguous beliefs. But then one may argue that in such contexts players
are unlikely to play any kind of equilibrium.24 We have two arguments in favour of the
combination of ambiguity and equilibrium. First, it provides a theoretical equivalent of a
controlled experiment. If we introduce ambiguity but otherwise keep assumptions similar to
a standard model then we know that any changes are due to the presence of ambiguity. In
contrast, if we change two or more assumptions of a standard model it is less clear which of
these is responsible for any new result.
A second argument in favour of the combination of ambiguity and equilibrium can be
drawn from Milgrom and Roberts (1990). They show that in games with strategic comple-
ments many naive adjustment processes will lead the players to the equilibrium. An example
would be playing a best response to the opponents previous move. This adjustment may
occur in real time. However, equally it may represent a thought process of the participants.
If there is ambiguity in the same class of games, a similar adjustment process would result
in convergence to the equilibrium. This is because what we refer to as the perturbed game
inherits the key property of strategic complementarity. Admittedly, contests do not satisfy
Milgrom and Roberts(1990) assumptions. However, we are reasonably condent that a sim-
ilar result can be proved in this context. This is because the best response correspondences
in contests are single peaked and the playersactions are strategic complements on the rst
part of the strategy space and strategic substitutes on the second part.
The paper developed in the paper uses the neo-additive model of ambiguity to represent
beliefs of the contenders about the strategies of their opponents. These preferences satisfy
both the axioms of CEU and Maxmin Expected Utility (MEU), which are two of the most
commonly used models of ambiguity. The results in Eichberger and Kelsey (2014) suggest
that our ndings can be generalised to the class of CEU preferences with a Ja¤ray-Phillipe
JP-capacity (Ja¤ray and Philippe, 1997). We also conjecture that the results in the present
paper could be extended to include the class of smooth ambiguity preferences (Hanany et al.,
2016). The present paper also opens the way for subsequent research on comparative statics
24We are indebted to Associate Editor Alan Beggs for bringing up this important point.
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in a larger class of games. Our conjecture is that similar comparative static results could
be proved for all well-behavedgames in which the (Nash) best response correspondence
is single peaked. This would be similar to the way in which Eichberger and Kelsey (2014)
generalise the model of public goods provision from Eichberger and Kelsey (2002). We leave
all of these interesting theoretical explorations to future research.
The model yields a number of testable hypotheses. It would be informative to empirically
investigate these in the lab and in the eld. To elicit ambiguity perceptions and attitudes
and their relationship to strategic behaviour, one could use a multi-stage procedure where
in one of the stages the subjectsattitudes to ambiguity are elicited using an Ellsberg style
experimental design while in the other stage these subjects strategically interact in a contest.
An alternative is to directly elicit experimental subjectsbeliefs about the strategies of their
opponents and relate them to strategic choices. Finally, one could introduce ambiguity
into an experimental setting by manipulating the identity of the opponent (Eichberger et
al., 2008) and then examining whether this is associated with any signicant changes in
behaviour.
Supplementary material
Supplementary material is available on the OUP website. This is the online appendix.
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